Tag: solution

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Is ‘Spare Vote’ like two-choice party voting

I have recently discovered Wikipedia an article at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spare_vote which seems to decribe two-choice party voting. I have copied most of it below in case it changes.

It is incorrect in my view to suggest that this is a form of single transferable vote STV. The second choice of party vote as I propose exists to avoid the problems arising from discarding party votes for under-threshold parties. It is very much simpler and much more useful than inviting multiple preferences.

I took the following as comment relevant to my proposal:

  • The spare vote is for asecond choice of political party, and this very different frfom STV.
  • The second vote comes into play only if the first choice party fails to pass threshold.
  • A voter should make sure that at least their second choice is for a party they consider certain enough to asss the threshold.
  • The idea was proposed about 2013 in Germany but rejected for unspecified reasons related to the German constitution.
  • The article proposes two methods of counting spare votes. My proposal matches the first of these, the one-step procedure, which as the article observes, is very simple to count. The one-step procedure is easily implemented and achieves all that is needed.
  • Other discussion is unrelated to the two-choice party voting proposal.
  • The article tends to affirm the idea of the ‘spare’ vote which I have referred to as ‘two choice party voting’.

The Wikiedia article: Spare vote

The spare vote[1] is a version of single transferable voting applied to the ranking of parties, first proposed for elections in Germany in 2013.[2] This preferential party system is a ranked proportional representation electoral system applying to political parties instead of individual candidates. The spare vote refers to a secondary vote (preference) of the voter, which only comes into play if the first preference, the political party preferred by the voter, is below the electoral threshold. In Germany, there were draft laws for the spare vote system in Saarland,[3] Schleswig-Holstein[2][4][5] and Brandenburg[6] federal states, but they were not implemented.Background

Under party-list proportional representation with a threshold, the fraction of unrepresented votes due to the electoral threshold can reach up to 30% and represents a democratic deficit as measured by disproportionality. Despite this, a spare vote is not a feature in any list PR system in use as of this date. The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral system is not required to have such a supplementary contingent vote feature.[7]

The term “spare vote” not only refers to the additional specification of a second preference but can also mean the electoral system working with a second preference as a whole. Not every second preference is a spare vote. Ranked voting systems differ in terms of their field of application, choice of party lists vs. choice of individuals. In particular, the following ranking procedures should be strictly distinguished from the spare vote:

The electoral threshold typical in party-list proportional representation and mixed-member proportional representation causes tactical voting and spoiler effects. Voters instead of casting their vote for a preferred party that presumably will fail to pass the electoral threshold tend to choose a less preferred party with a reliable chance of passing the electoral threshold. The security of the spare vote is intended to encourage voters to vote more honestly for their actually preferred party. On the ballot paper, the voter is given the opportunity to designate beside the first preference the spare vote, which becomes an effective vote only under the condition that the first preference fails to comply with the electoral threshold. To prevent that the spare vote falls below the electoral threshold as well, the voter should assign the spare vote to a party that is very likely to pass the electoral threshold. The spare vote continues to prevent the fragmentation of parliaments achieved by the electoral threshold.[8]

Variant

There are different methods for evaluating the spare votes:[9]

  • One-step procedure: All votes for parties that are below the electoral threshold according to the first preferences are discarded; in their place, the spare votes for these voters are counted. This is party list version of the contingent vote (if the voters may rank all parties) or supplementary vote (in case of just one spare vote).
  • Multi-round procedure: First the party with the least number of first preferences is eliminated, and the spare votes from its voters become effective. This is repeated until only parties that are above the electoral threshold are left. The benefit compared the one-step procedure is that some political parties could pass the electoral threshold only once spare votes become effective. This is the party list equivalent of the single transferable vote, which the quota being the electoral threshold.

Limiting the ranking of parties to two ranks allows a faster ballot counting procedure, where every electoral district reports only the counts of each party-pair. This procedure does not require all electoral districts to wait until the determination which parties have crossed the electoral threshold is finalized.[10] With more than two ranks of parties, the voters rank several spare votes/parties according to their preferences. In this process, a voter’s party vote is carried over until it either goes to a party that is above the electoral threshold or has passed through all of the voter’s stated preferences.

The spare vote can also be used in the proportional part of mixed electoral systems with electoral thresholds, and some mixed systems operate on the basis of an indirect spare party vote (mixed single vote) to reuse the candidates that did not receive a direct mandate in favour of the party list they are affiliated with. The second vote under mixed-member proportional systems may be considered a direct spare vote for a party, but not relating to the electoral threshold, but for the case when a voters favourite local candidate does not win in their district. This is also the case for the party list preference in the mixed ballot transferable vote (MBTV), which is may also use a ranked ballot capable of functioning a contingent party vote if combined with an electoral threshold. It is also the mixed equivalent of the spare vote (and STV, the non-partisan equivalent of the spare vote), meaning the spare vote is used in a two-tier election, and the spare vote is used on the upper (party-list) tier only if it would be wasted on the lower (candidate-based) tier. The process is the same as under the positive vote transfer mechanism of the mixed single vote (MSV), except under MSV, voters do not get to choose their party preference, it is defined by the candidate vote.

The modified d’Hondt electoral system[11] is another preferential party system, which allows to rank parties. It is a variant of single transferable voting, where an electoral threshold for parties is applied. I have applied strikethrough because I think this papagraph seems unrelated, being about a historic ystem briefly used in Australian STV.

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2022 Independent Electoral Review

The closing date for submissions to the 2022 Independent Electoral Review is 14 November 2022.

I have made two submissions and sent them the following documents:

  1. On the threshold and the associated wasted votes:
    Read my submission here: https://twochoicemmp.files.wordpress.com/2022/11/21105iersubmissiontwochoice-1.pdf
  2. Here is a powerpoint presentation about two-choice party voting

    As a powerpoint:
    https://twochoicemmp.files.wordpress.com/2022/11/i-want-mmp-to-include-me-2.pptx
    As a pdf:
    https://twochoicemmp.files.wordpress.com/2022/11/i-want-mmp-to-include-me-1.pdf
  3. On overhangs and independents.
    https://twochoicemmp.files.wordpress.com/2022/11/21107iersubmoverhangsefh-1.pdf

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Inquiry into 2020 election

I have just learnt from facebook that the Justice select committee of parliament is holding an inquiry into the 2020 election. This is apparently something routine after each election. Unfortunately the closing date for submissions was 6 April 2021, so I missed it by a week or so.

From what I have read, the problem of wasted votes creates a barrier to participation in the electoral process. In the 2020 election, about 8% of party votes were disregarded because the voter voted for a party that did not pass either of the thresholds, being 5% or an electorate seat.

Young voters are likely to be interested in new ideas and new parties. But we have a system that disenfranchies anybody who votes for a party that does not pass one or other threshold. This disenfranchisement of minor party voters, perhaps mostly young voters, has a discouraging effect on voter participation.

MMP aims to be a proportional system. But bizarrely we have chosen to disenfranchise a small but significant proportion of voters by discarding their votes. This is a severe deficiency in our supposedly proportional electoral system.

And the problem is not one of the size of the threshold. Reducing the threshold would indeed reduce the problem, and eliminating the threshold would eliminate the problem.

But the problem can be better eliminated by giving voters a second choice of party vote. This solution means that every voter can have a say in the makeup of parliament, as well as expressing support for a minor party.

The two-choice system for party voting effectively decouples the size of the threshold from the issue of wasted votes. We can retain MMP with the threshold at whatever level we want, and still have a highly proportional electoral system.

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A win-win solution to the threshold issue

The 5 per cent MMP threshold is regarded by many as the biggest problem in the New Zealand electoral system.  This problem remains perhaps because no solution has been found that satisfies two important interest groups.    One interest group wants the threshold reduced, because it leads to wasted votes and creates an excessive obstacle to new political parties.    But another wants to retain the threshold, because they fear a proliferation of small parties in parliament if the threshold were to be reduced.

There is a solution, one that arises from understanding some nuances of the apparently competing interests.  The interest group that wants the threshold reduced appears to be driven mainly by the desire to reduce the wasted votes that arise from a simple threshold.  The group that wants to retain the threshold is primarily concerned about avoiding a proliferation of small parties.

Seems to me there’s a deal to be made here.  Big parties get to keep the threshold percentage. Small parties get to see an end to most vote wasting.

What is exciting is that there is an easy way to achieve this.  Easy to understand, commonly used in the real world, easy to implement, ticks all the boxes.

Yes, the solution is to give each voter a second choice of party vote.  If the voter’s first choice party fails to pass the threshold, the vote goes to the second choice party.  So most voters would make sure one of their choices was for a party pretty certain to pass the threshold.

This proposal just requires a second party vote column on the party voting paper, and minor changes to vote counting.  Once we have totals for each threshold passing party, the existing seat allocation tool works exactly as now.

Just consider the pluses here. 

  1. Pressure to reduce the threshold percentage is lowered, making the big,  powerful parties more comfortable.
  2. A higher proportion of voters have a say in government formation.  We could go from around 92% to easily 99%.
  3. Nobody has to choose between voting for a minor party and abandoning the minor party for a major one so as to have a say in overall government formation.
  4. Minor parties probably get some more votes, because voters do not need to vote strategically, so the threshold seems less distant.
  5. Nobody needs to take into account the risk of wasted votes in any aspect of participation in an election.  That makes planning, and cooperation between like minded parties, much easier.
  6. Results would give a better indication of the real support for each party.
  7. The difference between a party just missing and just making the threshold cannot change the coalition-leading party.
  8. It is in many ways better than just reducing the threshold percentage slightly, because it puts a stop to all the perverse effects of wasted votes

So here we have a win-win solution to the long-standing MMP threshold problem.  And all at the small price of adding a column to the voting paper and inviting voters to place one more tick if they wish.

This idea may be useful in other MMP systems with thresholds.  Offering a second choice can be simply implemented and can help improve proportionality and encourage voters to express their real views.

Here is a mockup of a voting paper modified to provide for a second choice of party vote.

This is what the results table might look like, with the same format for everything between polling place and the whole country.

You can find out more about this proposal at www.twochoicemmp.nz

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The size of the threshold is not the problem

Here is a comment placed after the following article:

https://www.newsroom.co.nz/smooth-sailing-or-a-windy-road-for-electoral-reform

The problem with the threshold is not so much its size, but the fact that votes, if cast for parties that do not pass one or other treshold, are wasted.

The wasting of votes in this way is widely hated, for well-known reasons.

Reducing but not eliminating the threshold reduces but does not eliminaate this vote wasting effect.

Reducing or eliminating the threshold prejudices the avowed purpose of the threshold – to discourage the proliferation of small parties in parliament.

The solution is one easily understood and widely used in many situations where we want people to make choices, and we want to ensure that almost nobody misses out. That solution is to offer each voter a second choice of party vote.

No need for a complex preferential voting system. Just a second choice eliminates the problems. Voters can vote first choice for their preferrred party, and second choice for a party which they think is certain to pass the threshold. If their first choice does not pass one or other threshold, their vote goes to their second choice.

This is easy to understand, easy to implement, and solves the problem.

More details at twochoicemmp.wordpress.com