Category: Uncategorized

Posted on

Engineeered overhangs-solving them and wasted votes

At https://www.democracyproject.org.nz/p/democracy-briefing-politicians-must?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email Bryce Edward wrote on 19/10.2026 about the problem now facing New Zealand MMP of engineered overhangs.

I posted this comment:

“
There are two related problems with MMP.  Vote splitting is appreciated but works in an unconstructive way.  Votes for under-threshold parties are discarded, disenfranchising many voters.  Vote splitting invites a false separation of candidates from their allied parties.

These two problems appear to have a simple combined fix that resolves both issues.  We need to alter vote splitting so that every voter gets a say in the allocation of seats amongst threshold passing parties, and also so that voters cannot both vote for a winning local candidate and have a party vote for a different party.

This change does not even need a change in the voting paper layout, just a change in the instructions and vote counting.

1.  The electorate vote becomes the “main vote”, a vote for a party and (if one exists)its local candidate.

2.  The party vote becomes a “substitute party vote”.  This becomes the voter’s party  vote in the event that the main vote party does not pass the threshold and the main vote candidate is not elected as the local MP.

These minor changes transform the way MMP works.    They effectively prevent any voter getting two effective votes as is now possible.  It also removes the wasted votes problem.  If a voter’s main vote neither elects the local MP nor gives a party vote  to a threshold-passing party, the the substitute party vote comes into play.  This has the same constraints as the existing party vote: if you want your substitute party vote to count, you need to vote for a party that passes the threshold.   No more wasted votes.

This change does not completely eliminate overhangs, but it makes them difficult to create artificially.  The TPM issue is worth looking at here. The need to vote both for the party and its candidate makes overhangs rare but not impossible.

This is still vote splitting, but fixed so that it works usefully.  If you vote for a candidate, it means that you want that candidate’s party in parliament or that candidate as an independent local MP.  If neither of those happen, you get a substitute party vote which you can give to a party you are sure will pass the threshold.

These simple changes look like they fix the major problems of MMP.    You no longer have the wasted votes people so detest, nor the need to vote strategically.   Artificial overhangs   become effectively impossible.  And the result is extremely party proportional.
“

Where did this idea come from?

The idea of offering MMP voters a second choice of party vote has been around for many years in Germany and in New Zealand. This website focusses on this idea. The second choice of party vote has the effect of allowing each voter to both vote for their preferred party, and if this does not pass threshold, then to have a substitute party vote to vote for a party the voter deems certain enough to pass the threshold. This removes the problem of wasted votes and allows new parties to grow without harming allied but larger parties. The second choice of party vote has various names including spare vote, substitute vote.

The problem of engineered overhangs has been apparent for many years, It was a minor issue, but one that seems now to be seen as a strategic option. It is something that could be exploited in a way very detrimental to the MMP system.

A way to reduce, but not always ellininate, overhangs is to invite only one vote from each voter, this vote being for a party and its candidate. This makes impossible engineered overhangs through vote splitting, but it takes away the vote splitting that people like, even if many do not understand how it works.

I recently realised that these two ideas could be combined. One requires one less party vote column on the voting paper, the other an additional such column. Then came a realisation that both changes could be effected without adding or removing voting paper columns. All that is needed is updated instructions and vote counting methods.

The result is the proposal described above. It keeps vote splitting, but changes how that functions. Voters vote first for a party and its candidate (if there is a local candidate). In case their chosen party does not pass threshold and their chosen candidate does not get elected as local MP, then they can express a s ubstitute party vote to apply in such situations.

Posted on

In response to Grant Duncan “Politics Happens”

MMP: Is it a problem? 23 June 2026

Grant Duncan’s Politics Happens substack post wonders whether there is a problem with MMP.

Yes there is. There is an easily fixed design flaw which has dogged MMP since the beginning. The party vote tries to do two things at once. First to decide which parties qualify for seats, and second to decide how many seats each qualifying party wins.

In most aspets of life, if we want people to have a choice, but be sure each person can be involved, we offer a second choice.

If the restaurant does not have that special dish you like, they don’t send you away hungry, they offer a second choice.

MMP sends home hungry (by wasting their vote) anyone who supports a new party. To fix this in MMP we should offer a second choice of party vote.

The latest MMP review from 2024 was onto it. Here is a quote

4.34 Some submitters advocated strongly for second-choice voting to be introduced for the party vote (that is, an optional “back up” vote for another party if your first choice vote did not pass the threshold), whether the threshold is lowered or not. They …. noted it may improve voter participation rates, support sincere voting rather than tactical voting, reduce the proportion of votes that go to parties that cross neither threshold, reduce barriers for small and newly established parties, and only require a simple change to the ballot paper.

Read more about it here at http://www.ott.nz

Posted on

Some history of Second choice party voting

2003 Student Report at Victoria University, Welliington

Here is the full Winkler Constitutional Law Student Report from 2003

https://onthethreshold.nz/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2003winklersecondchoice153553111.pdf

Here is a document with selected parts of the full 2023 Winkler Report

https://onthethreshold.nz/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2003winklersecondchoiceselected.pdf

The 2012 MMP review

https://onthethreshold.nz/mmp-review-submissions/

A 2021 item on the Democracy Project website

Ed Hitchcock: A simple way to solve the problem of the MMP threshold

The 2023 Independent Electoral Review

The directory:

https://onthethreshold.nz/2023-independent-electoral-review/

My submission to the Interim Report

https://onthethreshold.nz/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/3717submission3hitchcock.pdf

Jesse Mulligan Interview of Ed Hitchcock on Radio NZ “Afternoons”, 16 May 2026

https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/afternoons/audio/2019035175/a-possible-path-for-political-parties-to-escape-the-5-trap

Germans are advancing the same idea, in 2026

Mehr-Demokratie (More Democracy), a German pro-democracy movement has a current campaign aiming to introduce second-choice party voting in Germany. Right click and choose Translate to see it in English

https://www.mehr-demokratie.de/mehr-bewegen/kampagnen/rettet-die-stimmen

Posted on

Final Report: 2023 Independent Electoral Review

This report acknowledges the Spare Vote and make very positive comments about it.

The final report was released by the new Minister of Justice Paul Goldsmith on 16 January 2024.


The main electoral system recommendations from this review report
included:
● Removing the one-seat threshold. This would mean that only
parties passing the party vote threshold could win list seats.
● Lowering the party vote threshold to 3.5%
● Changing the overhang rule to grant overhang seats, and to reduce
the number of list seats by the same amount, so leaving the number of seats unchanged.
● Fix the district/list seat ratio at 60:40 plus one list seat if necessary so as to always have an odd number of seats in parliament

I support the fixing of the 60:40 ratio.

But I fear that the other changes I’ve noted will replace existing problems with new ones.


The idea of the spare vote (second choice of party vote) was
acknowledged by the following paragraphs:


4.34 Some submitters advocated strongly for second-choice voting to be introduced for the party vote (that is, an optional “back up” vote for another party if your first choice vote did not pass the threshold), whether the threshold is lowered or not. They differentiated this idea from a full preferential voting system and noted it may improve voter participation rates, support sincere voting rather than tactical voting, reduce the proportion of votes that go to parties that cross neither threshold, reduce barriers for small and newly established parties, and only require a simple change to the ballot paper.

Then later:

4.58 Full preferential voting would allow voters to rank their preferred parties or candidates (for example, they could select a first, second, and third choice). If a voter’s first choice did not succeed, their vote would transfer to their next ranked party or candidate (and so on).


Second-choice voting is an example of partial preferential voting, where voters have the option of selecting a “back-up” party or candidate. Both types of preferential voting could make it easier for smaller parties to get into parliament because voters could support smaller or newly established parties or candidates without fear their vote will not count in the make-up of parliament.


4.59 We acknowledge the strong support these options received from some submitters during consultation, particularly second-choice voting.
However, we remain wary of changes that would complicate the voting process. Adding complexity to how MMP works could be counterproductive, particularly if introduced at the same time as other changes. For these reasons, we think improvements to representation
are better realised by lowering the party vote threshold without adding additional complexity.


I was pleased that the spare vote idea was acknowledged, and that the report notes some of its many advantages.


The final paragraph above was not altogether surprising. The spare vote is an idea that has received little attention so far. I would have been surprised to have a new idea, however good, accepted on the strength of a small number of submissions to a review.


But the report seems very supportive of the idea and the report remarks on the simplicity of the ballot paper changes required. So I feel encouraged.


The report was released by the new Minister of Justice Paul Goldsmith, who stated that some recommendations were already ruled out. These included lowering the voting age to 16 and allowing the vote to all prisoners.

Details at

https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/independent-electoral-review-final-report-released

It will be interesting to see which of the proposed changes garner enough support to be implemented.

Go to https://electoralreview.govt.nz/ for more details.

Posted on

Visualizing the Spare Vote

Here is a visualisation of how the Spare votes replaces wasted votes with votes for qualitying parties. It is based on 2020 General Election results

See how the wasted votes at bottom left are al;ost all replaced by intentional votes for qualifying parties at the right.

Data on the left is from 2020 General Election results. The transfers are just guesses ro show how second choice works.

Posted on

Thinking about overhangs

The concept of the second choice of party vote should work regardless of overhang rules. But if the coat-tails rule is abolished, there is an increased risk of overhangs. The method chosen to handle overhangs can disrupt the proportionality of the result.

In general, overhangs arise when a party or independent candidate win electorate seats, but the St Lague system allocates them fewer seats.

There are several main ways this can happen:

  • A dominant party overhang occurs when a large and dominant party wins more seats than its party votes justify. This happens frequently in other countries, but is very unlikely in New Zealand. Conceptually this type of overhang could occur where a party is very dominant only within a small region, but such situations have not yet occurred in New Zealand.
  • A vote-splitting overhang occurs when voters vote for a candidate for one party and give their party vote to another party. This has occurred in NZ when voters have voted for Maori party electorate candidates and given their party vote to the Labour Party. This practice could theoretically be practised widely, so gaming the system and greatly distorting proportionality,
  • A threshold-driven overhang occurs only in the absence of the present coat-tails rule. It occurs when a party wins an electorate seat, but not enough votes to pass the 5% threshold.

In reality there are overlaps between these types of overhangs, so that rules are needed that work in a wide variety of circumstances.

The threshold driven overhang occurs only if the present coat-tails rule is abolished. In New Zealand there have been several situations where MPs have resigned from major parties and created their own party. This type of situation demonstrates an inconsistency between handling of elecorate and party votes. Independents can be lone voices in parliament, while parties are allowed only if they can get to six seats (5% of 120).

At present when an overhang occurs the party or candidate is allocated a seat over and above the normal 120 seats in parliament, and the proportionality of parliament is disturbed.

Another method of handling overhangs is to take the overhang seats from the seats otherwise allocated to list votes, so avoiding extra seats in parliament. Proportionality is disturbed, but often not greatly in NZ, as the overhang seats are taken from parties approximately in turn, and in proportion to their party votes.

This method is used in a similar electoral system in Scotland. There the overhangs are mostly of the dominant party type. As a result the overhang seats are effectively taken from other parties to give to the dominant party, so substantially disturbing proportionality.

The use of a second choice of party vote does not alter the overhang problems outlined above. Dominant party overhangs are unlikely in NZ and not serious, so can be safely disregarded.

A better treatment is needed of overhangs resulting from independents without supporting party votes. It is complicated by the ideal of representation i proportional to party votes whereas an independent has not party votes.

And the solution needs to work around the inconsistency between allowing single seats for independents, but refusing representation for parties with less than 5% of the national party vote.

Here is a sugestion that could largely eliminate the overhang problem. But I need to look more closely to be sure.:

  1. in electorate contests, there will be one winner. typically in NZ with 12-20k votes.
  2. All voters who gave their electorate vote to this winner , will have their party vote redirected to that winner s party. For an independent, the party is just the candidate them selves. The winner will receive one seat from their party s allocation, irrespective of the quotient.

This method should ensures that an electorate winner receives approximately the normal quota of party votes for their seat, and uses them to gain a seat.

In this way every seat requires a quota of party votes. And there is only a limited total quantity in the election.

This system makes vote counting more complex, because it is necessary to keep a total for every combination of party vote and candidate vote.

So there are things to check here. Does this work in every likely circumstance? How would you organise vote counting?

Based on a small sample, when there are about 40 000 votes, with two major candidates, the winner gains at least about 19 000 votes. With three major candidates, the winner often received about 13 000 votes. A typicalNZ general election has 72 electorates each with 40 000 votes on average. That means 40 000 electorate votes and 40 000 party votes. This corresponds to 2.88 million votes. If a candidate wins on 13 000, there will normally be two others at about 12 000 each , and about 3 000 among other parties.

More information to come

Posted on

Latest summary: Why waste 5-8% of votes?

I’m writing about the MMP threshold, to suggest that lowering it is not a solution..

The problems for small parties under MMP, arise mainly from the wasted votes (typically 5-8%) that now occur, and the consequent spoiler effects for small parties.

Voters say “I do not want to waste my vote”.  Parties say to small parties on the same side of the house “Don’t take votes from us and then waste them”.  Small parties are spoilers.  People stay away.  New parties cannot get started.

So why do we waste around 5-8% or so of votes every election?  And cause all that anguish?  There seems to be no good reason.  And lowering the threshold does not remove the problem, or the dislike of the threshold.  

Instead offer voters a second choice of party vote.  If a voter’s first choice fails to pass the threshold, their vote goes to their second choice party.  Voters will be careful to make sure either first or second choice is certain enough to pass the threshold.

Problem solved.  That 5% threshold is no longer a problem. No voter needs to waste their vote. If a party misses the thresholds, its votes will mainly go instead to a bigger party on the same side of the house.  No longer are small parties spoilers.   Wasted votes should drop below 1%.

The second choice is easy to understand, easy to implement.  One extra column on the party voting paper.  For the voter, one optional extra tick.  Vote counting is just a little more involved than at present.  Results are independent for each polling place. 

This idea solves the wasted vote problem, while not requiring any change to the threshold.  

Is this the consensus solution that solves the threshold/wasted votes problem without needing to touch the threshold percentage?

Posted on

A second choice: like Supplementary vote for PR?

Supplementary vote is a voting system for selecting one person. Each voter may make a first and second choice (no more!). The top two candidates, on first choice votes, are retained. Where a voter voted for a candidate other than the top two, their second choice vote is applied, if it is for one of the top two candidates. This system is used for Mayoral races in the UK. SV is viewed as encouraging a more positive style of campaigning as candidates desire the second preferences of third parties.

Two-choice party voting has some similarities, except that it is used to measure voter support for parties under MMP. Parties passing a set threshold, on first choice votes, continue to the next stage, where they receive the second choice votes from voters whose first choice party did not pass the threshold.

Both of these systems are based on the idea that first and second choices are often clear in the voters minds. Using lower level preferences is less useful and makes complex many aspects of voting and vote counting.

These systems are simple, but get most of the benefits offfering preferences, while avoiding the complexity of multi-level preferences. Two-choice party voting means every voter can both vote for whichever party they wish, and have a say in the allocation of seats in parliament.

A two choice party voting paper might look like this (note itś simplicity!)
Posted on

Keep MMP but help more votes count

There is a very simple way of solving the MMP threshold problem, and it does not require that the threshold percentage be changed or eliminated.

People dislike the threshold (at whatrever level) because it causes wasted votes And the threat of wasted votes is a big problem, and bigger than it looks. People vote less often for small parties. People don t get involved in small parties because votes for a minor party are votes taken from that party s natural coalition partners.

The 5% threshold is a big problem. Small parties have difficulty getting started. The threat of wasted votes disocurages everyone, including voters, potential small party supporters, people considering forming new parties, the bigger parties who might cooperate with potential support parties.

The threshold means that anybody voting for a minor party has a very real chance that their vote will play no part in deciding which major party will form the next government. What a way to punish new or small parties!

Making the thresholds smaller is not much of a solution. The problem is still there, smaller, but still discouraging. There seems to be a view that a proliferation of small parties in parliament is to be avoided, so abolition is not widely favoured.

Recent articles on Stuff have commented that almost no new parties have gained seats in parliament in 25 years of MMP. A large part of the reason for that is perhaps the way the threshold punishes small parties and anyone associated with them.

There is a simple solution which completely eliminates the problem of wasted votes, which retains the threshold, which helps more people have their vote count, which improves the proportionality of the system, all the while leaving the workings of MMP almost completely unchanged.

Sounds too good to be true, no? All that is needed is to give voters a second choice of party vote. If the first choice party does not make the threshold, the vote goes to the voters second choice, normally for a party the voter thinks is certain to pass the threshold.

Easy to understand. Easy to implement. Easy to vote count and report results fast. Every voter can avoid their vote being wasted. The system is more proportional. Many people supported similar ideas in the 2012 review. Does not advantage left or right. And it is still the MMP that we know and love. But without the bad part.

Below: what the modified voting paper might look like.

More details at http://onthethreshold.nz