Engineeered overhangs-solving them and wasted votes

At https://www.democracyproject.org.nz/p/democracy-briefing-politicians-must?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email Bryce Edward wrote on 19/10.2026 about the problem now facing New Zealand MMP of engineered overhangs.

I posted this comment:

“
There are two related problems with MMP.  Vote splitting is appreciated but works in an unconstructive way.  Votes for under-threshold parties are discarded, disenfranchising many voters.  Vote splitting invites a false separation of candidates from their allied parties.

These two problems appear to have a simple combined fix that resolves both issues.  We need to alter vote splitting so that every voter gets a say in the allocation of seats amongst threshold passing parties, and also so that voters cannot both vote for a winning local candidate and have a party vote for a different party.

This change does not even need a change in the voting paper layout, just a change in the instructions and vote counting.

1.  The electorate vote becomes the “main vote”, a vote for a party and (if one exists)its local candidate.

2.  The party vote becomes a “substitute party vote”.  This becomes the voter’s party  vote in the event that the main vote party does not pass the threshold and the main vote candidate is not elected as the local MP.

These minor changes transform the way MMP works.    They effectively prevent any voter getting two effective votes as is now possible.  It also removes the wasted votes problem.  If a voter’s main vote neither elects the local MP nor gives a party vote  to a threshold-passing party, the the substitute party vote comes into play.  This has the same constraints as the existing party vote: if you want your substitute party vote to count, you need to vote for a party that passes the threshold.   No more wasted votes.

This change does not completely eliminate overhangs, but it makes them difficult to create artificially.  The TPM issue is worth looking at here. The need to vote both for the party and its candidate makes overhangs rare but not impossible.

This is still vote splitting, but fixed so that it works usefully.  If you vote for a candidate, it means that you want that candidate’s party in parliament or that candidate as an independent local MP.  If neither of those happen, you get a substitute party vote which you can give to a party you are sure will pass the threshold.

These simple changes look like they fix the major problems of MMP.    You no longer have the wasted votes people so detest, nor the need to vote strategically.   Artificial overhangs   become effectively impossible.  And the result is extremely party proportional.
“

Where did this idea come from?

The idea of offering MMP voters a second choice of party vote has been around for many years in Germany and in New Zealand. This website focusses on this idea. The second choice of party vote has the effect of allowing each voter to both vote for their preferred party, and if this does not pass threshold, then to have a substitute party vote to vote for a party the voter deems certain enough to pass the threshold. This removes the problem of wasted votes and allows new parties to grow without harming allied but larger parties. The second choice of party vote has various names including spare vote, substitute vote.

The problem of engineered overhangs has been apparent for many years, It was a minor issue, but one that seems now to be seen as a strategic option. It is something that could be exploited in a way very detrimental to the MMP system.

A way to reduce, but not always ellininate, overhangs is to invite only one vote from each voter, this vote being for a party and its candidate. This makes impossible engineered overhangs through vote splitting, but it takes away the vote splitting that people like, even if many do not understand how it works.

I recently realised that these two ideas could be combined. One requires one less party vote column on the voting paper, the other an additional such column. Then came a realisation that both changes could be effected without adding or removing voting paper columns. All that is needed is updated instructions and vote counting methods.

The result is the proposal described above. It keeps vote splitting, but changes how that functions. Voters vote first for a party and its candidate (if there is a local candidate). In case their chosen party does not pass threshold and their chosen candidate does not get elected as local MP, then they can express a s ubstitute party vote to apply in such situations.

Beware of organised overhangs

MMP aims to allocate seats in parliament in proportional to voter support for political parties. Two-choice voting can remove most of the distortions that arise from the use of party-vote thresholds. But should an indpendent win an electorate seat, or a party win more electorate seats than its party votes justify, then an <overhang> is created. This, in the NZ system, is addressed by creating extra seats. The Maori Party has won overhang seats a few times.

But this system seems to invite manipulation, by electing independents who are not really so. A party would encourage candidates in safe seats to become independent <friends of the party>. The home party would not stand a candidate against them. These <friends> would be expected to win their electorate seats, and create an overhang.

A similar idea has already been used in Epsom, where ACT has been able to win the electorate seat, while National benefitted from the party vote. In this case, I think the move helped ACT pass the one-seat threshold for being allocated seats.

This idea might be acceptable in isolated cases, but imagine if major parties has a dozen of these arrangements each. The result could be 20-seat overhangs.

One might hope that the voters would reject such moves as unfair, and punish those practising it. Or it could become an accepted political manoeuvre.

I think that the current electoral system review should ensure that the rules make such manoeuvres more difficult. But this does not seem easily achieved.

One method would be to require, instead of votes for person and party separately, a single vote for a person and their party. Thus a vote for a Blue party candidate would also be a party vote for the Blue Party. Two-choice party voting would work well with such a system, except that the first choice would be for person and first choice party, the second for a second choice party.

See here for a Stuff article that mentions this issue.

A two-choice MMP voting paper might look like this:

A two-choice MMP voting paper might look like this